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Abstract
Interactions among individuals in natural populations often occur in a dynamically chang-
ing environment. Understanding the role of environmental variation in population dynamics
has long been a central topic in theoretical ecology and population biology. However, the key
question of how individuals, in the middle of challenging social dilemmas (e.g., the “tragedy
of the commons”), modulate their behaviors to adapt to the fluctuation of the environment
has not yet been addressed satisfactorily. Utilizing evolutionary game theory and stochastic
games, we develop a game-theoretical framework that incorporates the adaptive mechanism
of reinforcement learning to investigate whether cooperative behaviors can evolve in the
ever-changing group interaction environment. When the action choices of players are just
slightly influenced by past reinforcements, we construct an analytical condition to determine
whether cooperation can be favored over defection. Intuitively, this condition reveals why
and how the environment can mediate cooperative dilemmas. Under our model architecture,
we also compare this learning mechanism with two non-learning decision rules, and we find
that learning significantly improves the propensity for cooperation in weak social dilemmas,
and, in sharp contrast, hinders cooperation in strong social dilemmas. Our results suggest
that in complex social-ecological dilemmas, learning enables the adaptation of individuals
to varying environments.
Keywords: reinforcement learning, evolutionary game theory, adaptive behavior, cooperative
dilemma
1 Introduction
Throughout the natural world, cooperating through enduring a cost to endow unrelated others
with a benefit is evident at almost all levels of biological organisms, from bacteria to primates [1].
∗Corresponding authors: Long Wang (longwang@pku.edu.cn) and Ming Cao (m.cao@rug.nl).
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This phenomenon is especially true for modern human societies with various institutions and
nation-states, in which cooperation is normally regarded as the first choice to cope with some
major global challenges, such as curbing global warming [2, 3] and governing the commons [4].
However, the mechanism underlying cooperative behavior has perplexed evolutionary biologists
and social economists for a long time [5, 6]. Since according to the evolutionary theory of
“survival of the fittest” and the hypothesis of Homo economicus, this costly prosocial behavior
will be definitively selected against and should have evolved to be dominated by selfish act [7].
To explain how cooperation can evolve and be maintained in human societies or other animal
groups, a large body of theoretical and experimental models have been put forward based on
evolutionary game theory [6, 8, 9] and social evolution theory [10]. Traditionally, the vast major-
ity of the previous work addressing this cooperative conundrum concentrates on the intriguing
paradigm of a two-player game with two strategies, the prisoner’s dilemma [6, 11]. Motivated
by abundant biological and social scenarios where interactions frequently occur in a group of
individuals, its multi-person version – the public goods game – has attracted much attention
in recent years [12]. Meanwhile, it also prompts a growing number of researchers to devote
to studying multi-player games and multi-strategy games [13, 14, 15, 16, 17]. However, these
prominent studies implicitly assume, as most of the canonical work does, that the game environ-
ment is static and independent of players’ actions. In other words, in these models, how players
act by choosing game-play strategies only affects the strategic composition in the population,
but the game environment itself is not influenced. As a result, a single fixed game is played
repeatedly. Of course, this assumption is well grounded, if the timescale of interest (e.g., the
time to fixation or extinction of a species) is significantly shorter than that of the environmental
change. For most of realistic social and ecological systems, however, it seems to be too idealized.
Hence, an explicit consideration of environmental change is needed. A prototypical instance is
the overgrazing of common pasture lands [18], where the depleted state may force individuals
to cooperate and accordingly the common-pool resources will increase, whereas the replete state
may induce defection and the common-pool resources will decrease [19, 20]. Other examples
also exist widely across scales from small-scale microbes to large-scale human societies [21]. A
common feature of these examples is the existence of the feedback loop where individual behav-
iors alter environmental states, and are influenced in turn by the changed environment [19, 22].
Although the effect of environmental variations on population dynamics has long been recog-
nized in theoretical ecology and population biology [23, 24, 25], it is only recently that there has
been a surge of interest in constructing game-environment feedbacks [19, 20, 22, 26, 27, 28, 29]
to understand the puzzle of cooperation. Different from the conventional settings in evolutionary
game theory [8, 9], the key conceptual innovation of these work is the introduction of multiple
games [30, 31], evolving games [32], dynamical system games [33], or stochastic games [34, 35].
By doing so, the players’ payoff depends on not only strategic interactions but also the environ-
mental state, and meanwhile, the fluctuation of the environment will be subject to the actions
adopted by players. So, the consideration of a dynamic game environment for the evolution
of cooperation has as least two significant implications. On the one hand, it vastly expands
the existing research scope of evolutionary game theory by adding a third dimension (multiple
games) to the previous two-dimension space (multiple players and multiple strategies) [31]. In
other words, this extension generalizes the existing framework to encompass a broader range
of scenarios. On the other hand, the new key component, environmental feedbacks [19, 22], is
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integrated seamlessly into the previous theoretical architecture.
While these promising studies primarily focused on pre-specified or pre-programmed be-
havioral policies to analyze the interdependent dynamics between individual behaviors and en-
vironmental variations, the key question of how individuals adjust their behaviors to adapt to
the changing environment has not yet been sufficiently addressed. In fact, when confronting
complex biotic and abiotic environmental fluctuations, how organisms adaptively modulate their
behaviors is of great importance for their long-term survival efforts [24, 36]. For example, those
plants growing in the lower strata of established canopies can adjust their stem elongation and
morphology in response to the spectral distribution of radiation, especially the ratio of red to
far-red wavelength bands [37]; in arid regions, bee larvae, as well as angiosperm seeds, strictly
comply with a bet-hedging emergence and germination rule such that reproduction activities are
only limited to a short period of time following the desert rainy season [38]. Particularly, as an
individual-level adaptation, learning through reinforcement is a fundamental cognitive or psy-
chological mechanism used by humans and animals to guide action selections in response to
the contingencies provided by the environment [39, 40, 41]. Employing the experience gained
from historical interactions, individuals always tend to reinforce those actions that will increase
the probability of rewarding events and lower the probability of aversive events. Although this
learning principle has become a central method in various disciplines, such as artificial intelli-
gence [41, 42], neurosicence [40], learning in games [43], and behavioral game theory [44], there
is still a lack of the theoretical understanding of how it guides individuals to make decisions in
order to resolve cooperative dilemmas.
In the present work, we develop a general framework to investigate whether cooperative be-
haviors can evolve by learning through reinforcement in constantly changing multi-player game
environments. To characterize the interplay between players’ behaviors and environmental vari-
ations, we propose a normative model of multi-player stochastic games, in which the outcome
of one’s choice relies on not only the opponents’ choices but also the current game environment.
Moreover, we use a social network to capture the spatial interactions of individuals. Instead of
using a pre-specified pattern, every decision-maker in our model learns to choose a behavioral
policy by associating each game outcome with reinforcements. By doing so, our model not
only considers the environmental feedback, but also incorporates a cognitive or psychological
feedback loop (i.e., players’ decisions determine their payoffs in the game, and in turn are af-
fected by the payoffs). When selection intensity is so weak that the action choices of players
are just slightly influenced by past reinforcements, we derive the analytical condition that allows
for cooperation to evolve under the threat of the temptation to defection. Through extensive
agent-based simulations, we validate the effectiveness of the closed-form criterion in well-mixed
and structured populations. Also, we compare the learning mechanism with two non-learning
decision rules, and interestingly, we find that learning markedly improves the propensity for
cooperation in weak social dilemmas whereas hinders cooperation in strong social dilemmas.
Furthermore, when the game is not stationary, we analyze how cooperation co-evolves with envi-
ronmental states and the effect of external incentives on the cooperative evolution by agent-based
simulations.
3
2 Model and Methods
2.1 Model
We consider a finite population of N individuals living in an evolving physical or social envi-
ronment. The population structure describing how individuals interact with their neighbors is
characterized by a network, where nodes represent individuals and edges indicate interactions.
When individuals interact with their neighbors, only two actions, cooperation (C) and defection
(D), are available, and initially, every individual is initialized with a random action in the set
A = {C, D} with a certain probability. In each time step, one individual is chosen randomly
from the population to be the focal player, and then its d − 1 neighbors as co-players are se-
lected at random to form a d-player (d ≥ 3) stochastic game [34, 35]. To ensure that the game
can always be organized successfully, we assume that each individual in the population has at
least d − 1 neighbors. Denote the possible number of C players among d− 1 co-players by the
set J , {0, 1, . . . , d − 1}, and possible environmental states by the set S , {s1, s2, . . . , sM},
where si, i = 1, 2, . . . , M, represents the environmental state of type i. Then, depending on
the co-players’ configuration j ∈ J and the environmental state s ∈ S in the current round,
each player will gain a payoff given in Table 1. Players who take action C will get a payoff
aj(s) ∈ R, whereas those who take action D will get a payoff bj(s) ∈ R, where R represents
the set of real numbers. Players update their actions asynchronously; that is, in each time step,
only the focal player updates its action, and other individuals still use the actions in the previous
round. More specifically, to prescribe the updating rule, we define the policy π(s, j, a; θ, β) to
quantify the probability that action a is chosen by the focal player when there are j opponents
taking action C among d− 1 co-players in the environmental state s ∈ S , where θ ∈ RL is the
column parameter vector of L-dimension (L ≪ M to reduce dimensions) used for updating the
policy by learning through reinforcement, and β ∈ [0,+∞) is the selection intensity [45], also
termed the adaptation rate [46], which captures the effect of past reinforcements on the current
action choice.
Table 1: Payoff table of the d-player stochastic game.
Number of C co-players d− 1 . . . j . . . 0
C ad−1(s) . . . aj(s) . . . a0(s)
D bd−1(s) . . . bj(s) . . . b0(s)
After each round, players’ decisions regarding whether to cooperate or defect in the game
interaction will not only influence their immediate payoffs but also the environmental state in
the next round. That is to say, the probability of the environmental state in the next round is
conditioned on the action chosen by the focal player and the environmental state in the current
round. Without loss of generality, we here assume that the dynamics of environmental states
{st} obey an irreducible and aperiodic Markov chain, which thus possesses a unique stationary
distribution. Also, from Table 1, it is clear that the payoff of each player is a function of the
environmental state. Therefore, when the environment transits from one state to another, the type
of the normal-form (multi-player) game defined by the payoff table will be altered accordingly.
The emergence of the new environmental state in the next round, apart from influencing the
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game type, may also trigger players to adjust their behavioral policies. This is because those
previously used decision-making schemes may not be appropriate anymore in the changed en-
vironment. We here consider a canonical learning mechanism, actor-critic reinforcement learn-
ing [39, 40, 41], to characterize the individual adaptation to the fluctuating environment. Specif-
ically, after each round, the players’ payoffs received from the game interaction will play a role
of the incentive signal of the interactive scenario. If one choice gives rise to a higher return in
a certain scenario, then it will be reinforced with a higher probability in the future when en-
countering the same situation again. In contrast, those choices resulting in lower payoffs will be
weakened gradually. Technically, this process is achieved via updating the learning parameter
θ of the policy after each round (see Methods for more details). In the successive round, the
acquired experience will be shared within the population and the updated policy will be reused
by the newly chosen focal player to determine which action to be taken. In a similar way, this
dynamical process of game formation and policy updating is repeated infinitely (Fig. 1).
 
st st+
Time
(a)
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Figure 1: Illustration of evolutionary dynamics for 4-player stochastic games in the structured population. (a),
At a time step t, a random individual is chosen as the focal player (depicted by the dashed red circle), and then
its 3 neighbors are selected randomly as co-players to form a 4-player game (because the focal player only has 3
neighbors, all of them are chosen.), which is depicted by the light magenta shaded area. Conditioned on the focal
player’s action and the environmental state st at time t, the environmental state at time t + 1 will change to st+1
with a transition probability. Similarly, a new round of the game will be reorganized at time t + 1. This process is
repeated infinitely. (b), At time t, after perceiving the environmental state st and the co-players’ configuration j, the
focal player uses the policy π to determine which action to be taken, whereas its co-players still use their previous
actions in the last round. At the end of this round, each player will gain a payoff. The received payoff will play the
role of the feedback signal, and render the updating of the policy used by the focal player.
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2.2 Methods
2.2.1 Actor-critic reinforcement learning
As the name suggests, the architecture of the actor-critic reinforcement learning consists of two
modules. The actor module maintains and learns the action policy. Generally, there are two
commonly used forms, ǫ-greedy and Boltzmann exploration [41, 42]. Here, we adopt the latter
for convenience, and consider the following Boltzmann distribution with a linear combination of
features,
π(s, j, a; θ, β) =
eβθ
Tφs,j,a
∑b∈A e
βθTφs,j,b
, ∀s ∈ S , j ∈ J , a ∈ A, (1)
where φs,j,a ∈ R
L is the column feature vector with the same dimension of θ, which is hand-
crafted to capture the important features when a focal player takes action a given the environmen-
tal state s and the number of C players j among its d− 1 co-players. For the construction of the
feature vector, there are many options, such as polynomials, Fourier basis, radial basis functions,
and artificial neural networks [41]. As mentioned in the Model, β controls the selection intensity,
or equivalently the adaptation rate. If β → 0, it defines a weak selection and the action choice is
only slightly affected by past reinforcements. When β = 0, in particular, players choose actions
with uniform probability. In contrast, if β → +∞, the action with the maximum θTφs,j,a will be
exclusively selected.
Another module is the critic, which is used for learning an appropriate evaluation of the
policy. For the long-run expected return of the policy per step, we evaluate it by defining a
function ρ(π),
ρ(π) , lim
t→∞
1
t
E{r1 + r2 + · · ·+ rt|π}, (2)
where rt+1 ∈ {ad−1(s), . . . , a0(s), bd−1(s), . . . , b0(s)} is a random variable which denotes the
payoff of the focal player at time t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}. In particular, if one denotes the probability
when starting from the initial state s0 the environmental state at time t is st under the policy π
by Pr{st = s|s0,π}, and the average probability that all possible individuals chosen as the focal
player encounter j opponents taking action C among d − 1 co-players by p·j, then ρ(π) can be
given by
ρ(π) = ∑
s∈S
dπ(s) ∑
j∈J
p·j ∑
a∈A
π(s, j, a; θ, β)Ras,j , (3)
where dπ(s) = limt→∞ Pr{st = s|s0,π} is the stationary distribution of environmental states
under the policy π; Ras,j is the payoff of the focal player when it takes action a given the envi-
ronmental state s and the number of C players j among d− 1 co-players, which can be given by
Ras,j =
{
aj(s), if a = C;
bj(s), if a = D.
(4)
Moreover, to evaluate the long-term accumulative performance of the policy, we define a
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Q-value function,
Qπ(s, j, a) ,
∞
∑
t=1
E{rt − ρ(π)|s0 = s, j0 = j, a0 = a,π}, ∀s ∈ S , j ∈ J , a ∈ A, (5)
which is a conditional value dependent on the initial action a0 = a, environmental state s0 = s,
and the number of C players j0 = j among d− 1 co-players at time t = 0. Since the space of the
environmental state is usually combinatorial and thus extremely large in many game scenarios,
it is not possible to calculate the Q-value function exactly for every environmental state, even in
the limit given infinite time and data [41]. Typically, one effective way to deal with this problem
is to find a good approximation of the value function using limited computational resources. To
this end, we approximate the Q-value function by a linear estimator [47, 48], fw(s, j, a), given
by
fw(s, j, a) = w
T[
∂π(s, j, a; θ, β)
∂θ
1
π(s, j, a; θ, β)
]
= wT[φs,j,a − ∑
b∈A
π(s, j, b; θ, β)φs,j,b]β,
(6)
where w ∈ RL is the column parameter vector used for updating the estimator.
After a round t, depending on the payoff rt+1 received by the focal player in the game, the
policy of the focal player and the estimator of the Q-value function will be updated simultane-
ously via the following algorithm (see Supporting Information SI.1 for the algorithm derivation),
wt+1 = wt + αt[rt+1− R¯t + fwt(st+1, jt+1, at+1)− fwt(st, jt, at)]
∂ fwt(st, jt, at)
∂wt
,
θt+1 = θt + γt
∂π(st, jt, at; θt, β)
∂θt
1
π(st, jt, at; θt, β)
fwt(st, jt, at),
(7)
where R¯t is the estimation of ρ(π), and iterates through R¯t+1 = R¯t + [rt+1 − R¯t]/(t + 1) and
R¯0 = 0, t = 0, 1, 2, . . .; αt and γt are learning step-sizes which are positive, non-increasing for
∀t, and satisfy ∑t αt = ∑t γt = ∞, ∑t α
2
t < ∞, ∑t γ
2
t < ∞, and
γt
αt
→ 0 for t → +∞. These
conditions required for the learning step-sizes guarantee that the policy parameter θt is updated at
a slower time scale than that of the function approximation wt, and thus assure the convergence
of the learning rule [48, 49, 50].
2.2.2 Evolution of cooperative behaviors
To capture the evolutionary process of cooperation, we first denote the number of C players in
the population by nt at time t. Since there is only one individual to alter its action per step in our
model, all possible changes of nt in each time step will be limited to increasing by one, decreas-
ing by one, or keeping unchanged. It implies that the evolutionary process of cooperation can
be formulated as a Markov chain {nt} defined over the finite state space N = {0, 1, 2, . . . , N}.
7
Meanwhile, the transition probability from nt = u ∈ N to nt+1 = v ∈ N can be calculated by
pu,v(t) = ∑
s∈S
Pr{st = s|s0,π} ∑
j∈J


pC pC,jπ(s, j, C; θt, β) + pD pD,jπ(s, j, D; θt, β), for v = u;
pC pC,jπ(s, j, D; θt, β), for v = u− 1;
pD pD,jπ(s, j, C; θt, β), for v = u + 1;
0, otherwise;
(8)
where pC = u/N (resp. pD = (N− u)/N) is the probability that an individual who previously
took action C (resp. D) is chosen as the focal player at time t; pC,j (resp. pD,j) is the average
probability that players who previously took action C (resp. D) encounter j opponents taking
action C among d − 1 co-players at time t. It is clear that the Markov chain is non-stationary
because the transition probabilities change with time.
To find the average abundance of cooperators in the population, we first note that the actor-
critic reinforcement learning converges [47, 48] and the environmental dynamics have been de-
scribed by an irreducible and aperiodic Markov chain. That is, the policy parameter θt will
converge to a local optimum of ρ(π), θ∗ = limt→∞ θt (see Supporting Information SI.1 for
details), and the dynamics of environmental states will have a unique stationary distribution
dπ(s) = limt→∞ Pr{st = s|s0,π}. Using these two facts, it follows that the probability transi-
tion matrix P(t) = [pu,v(t)](N+1)×(N+1) will converge to P
∗ = [p∗u,v](N+1)×(N+1) for t → ∞,
where
p∗u,v = lim
t→∞
pu,v(t)
= ∑
s∈S
dπ(s) ∑
j∈J


pC pC,jπ(s, j, C; θ
∗, β) + pD pD,jπ(s, j, D; θ
∗, β), for v = u;
pC pC,jπ(s, j, D; θ
∗, β), for v = u− 1;
pD pD,jπ(s, j, C; θ
∗, β), for v = u + 1;
0, otherwise.
(9)
In addition, it is noteworthy that the Markov chain described by the probability transition matrix
P∗ will be irreducible and aperiodic. This is because based on the probability transition matrix
P∗, any two states of theMarkov chain are accessible to each other and the period of all states is 1.
Hence, one can conclude that the non-stationary Markov chain {nt} is strongly ergodic [51, 52]
and there exists a unique long-run (i.e., stationary) distribution X = [xn]1×(N+1), n ∈ N .
Therein, the distribution X can be obtained by calculating the left eigenvector corresponding to
eigenvalue 1 of the probability transition matrix P∗, i.e., the unique solution to X(P∗ − I) =
0N+1 and ∑n∈N xn = 1, where I is the identity matrix with the same dimension of P
∗ and 0N+1
is the row vector with N + 1 zero entries. When the system has reached the stationary state, the
average abundance of C players in the population can be computed by 〈xC〉 = ∑n∈N (xn ·n/N).
If 〈xC〉 > 1/2, it implies that C players are more abundant than D players in the population.
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3 Results
3.1 Conditions for the prevalence of cooperation
We first study the condition under which cooperation can be favored over defection, and restrict
our analysis in the limit of weak selection (β → 0) given that finding a closed-form solution
to this problem for arbitrary selection intensity is usually NP-complete or # P-complete [53].
In the absence of mutations, such a condition can be obtained in general by comparing the
fixation probability of cooperation with that of defection [45]. In our model, however, how
players update their actions is conducted by the policy with an exploration-exploitation trade-
off, which possesses a similar property as the mutation-selection process [54]. Thus, in this
case, we need to calculate the average abundance of C players when the population has reached
the stationary state, and determine whether it is higher than that of D players [55]. Using
all aj(s) to construct the vector A = [a(s
1), a(s2), . . . , a(sM)]T , and all bj(s) to construct
the vector B = [b(s1), b(s2), . . . , b(sM)]T, where a(sk) = [a0(s
k), a1(s
k), . . . , ad−1(s
k)] and
b(sk) = [bd−1(s
k), bd−2(s
k), . . . , b0(s
k)], k = 1, 2, . . . , M, it follows that under weak selection
the average abundance of C players in the stationary state is (see Supporting Information SI.2 for
details)
〈xC〉 =
1
2
+
1
N
[
∑
s∈S
dπ(s)θ∗TΦs(A − B)
]
β+ o(β), (10)
and thus it is higher than that of D players if and only if
∑
s∈S
dπ(s)θ∗TΦs(A − B) > 0, (11)
where Φs, for ∀s ∈ S , are some coefficient matrices needed to be calculated for the given
population structure and every environmental state s, but independent of both aj(s) and bj(s) for
∀j ∈ J and ∀s ∈ S .
To obtain an explicit formulation of condition (11), we further consider two specific pop-
ulation structures, well-mixed populations and structured populations. In the former case, the
interactive links of individuals are described by a complete graph, whereas in the latter case,
they are described by a regular graph with node degree d− 1. When the population size is suffi-
ciently large, in the limit of weak selection, we find that condition (11) in these two populations
reduces to an identical closed form (see Supporting Information SI.3 for details),
∑
s∈S
dπ(s)
d−1
∑
j=0
(
d− 1
j
)
1
2d+1
θ∗T
[
φs,j,C − φs,j,D
]
> 0. (12)
Through extensive agent-based simulations, we validate the effectiveness of this criterion. As
illustrated in Fig. 2, we have calculated the average abundance of C players in the population with
two distinct environmental states, s1 and s2, which, for instance, can represent the prosperous
state and degraded state of a social-ecological system [19, 56], respectively. To specify the type
of the normal-formmulti-player game defined by the payoff Table 1 for each given environmental
state, in Fig. 2, we consider that one of the three candidates, the public goods game (PGG) [18],
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threshold public goods game (TPGG) [3, 57], and d-player snowdrift game (dSD) [58], is played
in each state. In these three kinds of games, the implication of defection is unanimous and it
means not to contribute. However, in defining cooperative behaviors and calculating payoffs,
there are some differences. In the PGG, action C means contributing a fixed amount c to the
common pool. After a round of donation, the sum of all contributions from the d-player group
will be multiplied by a synergy factor rs > 1 and then allotted equally among all members,
where the value of rs depends on the current game environment s. In this case, the payoffs
of cooperators and defectors are computed by aj(s) = (j + 1)rsc/d − c and bj(s) = jrsc/d,
j ∈ J , respectively. The aforementioned setting is also true for the TPGG, except that there
exists a minimum contribution effort, T, for players to receive benefits. More specifically, only
when the number of C players in the d-player game is not smaller than T, can each player receive
a payoff from the common pool; otherwise, everyone gets nothing. It then follows that a C player
will receive a payoff aj(s) = (j + 1)crs/d − c for j ≥ T − 1 and aj(s) = 0 otherwise, whereas
a D player will receive bj(s) = jcrs/d for j ≥ T and bj(s) = 0 otherwise. Different from
the PPG and TPGG, in the dSD, action C means endowing everyone with a fixed payoff Bs and
simultaneously sharing a total cost C evenly with the other C players, where Bs depends on the
environmental state s. In this case, the payoffs of cooperators and defectors are then changed to
aj(s) = Bs − C/(j + 1) for j ∈ J , and bj(s) = Bs for j > 0 and b0(s) = 0, respectively.
As shown in Fig. 2, the analytical predictions of the average abundance of C players are highly
consistent with simulation results, which suggests that criterion (12) is effective for determining
whether cooperation can outperform defection.
Moreover, conditions (11) and (12) offer us an intuitional theoretical interpretation of why
the environment can mediate social dilemmas [21]. As shown in Fig. 2, in an identical scenario,
the average abundance of C players is always less than 1/2 in the homogeneous state where
the PGG is played, whereas it is greater than 1/2 in some homogeneous states where a TPGG
or dSD is played. The reason is that the social dilemma in the TPGG and dSD is weaker than
that in the PGG. Thus, cooperation in these two kinds of games is easier to evolve. Namely,
if the environment is homogeneous, condition (11) or (12) in the PGG is more difficult to be
satisfied in contrast to the TPGG or dSD. Due to the existence of the underlying transition of the
environment, however, the population may have some opportunities to extricate itself from those
hostile environmental states where defection is dominant (e.g., the state of the PGG). This case
is especially likely after some prosocial behaviors have been implemented by players [20, 28,
56]. As such, the population will spend some time staying in the states where defection is not
always favorable (e.g., the TPGG or dSD). Consequently, the changing environment balances
the conditions that favor vs. undermine cooperation, and meanwhile the social dilemma that the
population is confronted with is diluted. Such an observation is also in line with the fact that the
final outcome of whether cooperation can evolve is a convex combination of those results in each
homogeneously environmental state, as shown in conditions (11) and (12).
3.2 Learning vs. non-learning
Here, we first exclude the effect of reinforcement learning, and apply our model framework to
study two prototypical non-learning updating processes, the smoothed best response [11] and the
aspiration-based update [57, 59]. For the former, in each time step, the focal player chosen in
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Figure 2: Average abundance of C players in the population as a function of the stationary proportion of different
games. In each homogeneous environmental state, s1 or s2, one of the three normal-form games, the public goods
game (PGG), threshold public goods game (TPGG), and d-player snowdrift game (dSD), is played. In the top row,
three transition graphs are depicted to describe how environmental states transit from one to another depending on
players’ action choices. Corresponding to these three transition graphs, the bottom row shows the average abundance
of C players in various population structures, based on numerical calculations and simulations. All simulations are
obtained by averaging 40 network realizations and 108 time steps after a transient time of 107, and θ is normalized
per step to unify the magnitude. Parameter values: N = 400, β = 0.01, C = c = 1.0, rs = 3.0 in the PGG while
rs = 4.0 in the TPGG, Bs = 12 in (b) while Bs = 4 in (c), and T = [d/2] + 1 ([·] represents the integer part).
our model revises its action by comparing the payoff of cooperation with that of defection, and
the more profitable action will be adopted. Instead of doing this in a deterministic fashion, in
many real-life situations, it is more reasonable to assume that the choice of the best response is
achieved smoothly and influenced by noise. One typical form to model this process is the Fermi
function [11],
π(s, j, a; β) =
1
1+ e
−β[Ras,j−R
b
s,j]
, ∀s ∈ S , j ∈ J , a, b( 6= a) ∈ A, (13)
which specifies the probability for the focal player to choose action a ∈ A. For the latter,
however, the focal player determines whether to switch to a new action by comparing the action’s
payoff with an internal aspiration level. If the payoff is higher than the aspiration level, the focal
player will switch to that action with a higher probability. Otherwise, its action is more likely to
keep unchanged. Similarly, the commonly used form to quantify the probability that the focal
player switches to the new action a ∈ A is still the Fermi function [57, 59],
π(s, j, a; β) =
1
1+ e
−β[Ras,j−E)]
, ∀s ∈ S , j ∈ J , a ∈ A, (14)
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where a constant aspiration level E is adopted because heterogenous aspirations [59] or time-
varying aspirations (see Supporting Information SI.4) cannot result in altering the evolutionary
outcome under weak selection. Using these two non-learning updating functions as the decision-
making policy of the focal player, under our model framework, we find that in the limit of weak
selection, cooperation is more abundant than defection if and only if
∑
s∈S
dπ(s) ∑
j∈J
σj[aj(s)− bd−1−j(s)] > 0, (15)
where σj, ∀j ∈ J , are some coefficients needed to be calculated for the given population struc-
ture, but independent of both aj(s) and bj(s). In either well-mixed populations or structured pop-
ulations, we find that the coefficients are σj = (
d−1
j )/2
d+1 for the smoothed best response and
σj = (
d−1
j )/2
d+2 for the aspiration-based update (see Supporting Information SI.4 for details).
In particular, if the population consistently stays in a homogeneous environment, condition (15)
will reduce to the “sigma-rule” in the context of multi-player games [15].
In a population where there are three distinct environmental states and in each state one
of the PGG, TPGG, and dSD, is played, we compare the results obtained by learning through
reinforcement with those obtained from the two non-learning updates. As illustrated in Fig. 3, we
calculate the average abundance of C players and the expected payoff of focal players per round
for all possible stationary distributions of environmental states. Intriguingly, we find that learning
enables the adaptation of players to the varying environment. When the population stays in the
environment where players are confronted with a weak social dilemma (i.e., the TPGG or dSD
will be more likely to be played than the PGG), learning players will have a higher propensity for
cooperation than those non-learning players. Moreover, they will reap a higher expected payoff
per step. In contrast, when the population stays in the environment where the social dilemma is
strong (i.e., the PGG will be more likely to be played than the TPGG and dSD), learning players
will have a lower propensity for cooperation and meanwhile they will receive a lower expected
payoff per step than non-learning players. Once again, we demonstrate that the analytical results
are consistent with the agent-based simulations (see Supporting Information Fig. S5).
3.3 Evolutionary dynamics under non-stationary conditions
The aforementioned analysis mainly focuses on the stationary population environment, i.e., the
environmental states have a unique stationary distribution for the long-run evolution. Here, we
relax this setup to study the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation under two kinds of non-
stationary conditions by agent-based simulations.
3.3.1 Non-stationary environmental state distribution
The first case that we are interested in is that the probability distribution of environmental states
changes over time. In a population with two environmental states, s1 and s2, we denote the av-
erage proportion of the time that the environment stays in state s1 (i.e., the average probability
that the environment stays in s1 per step) by z ∈ [0, 1]. Then, the average fraction of time in
state s2 is 1− z. To describe the type of the game played in each environmental state, let s1 be
the prosperous state where environmental resources are replete and players are at the risk of the
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Figure 3: Differences in the average abundance of C players and the expected payoff of players per round between
the reinforcement learning (RL) and two non-learning updates. In (a) and (d), we show the average abundance of C
players and the expected payoff per round when players update actions via the RL, respectively. Taking them as the
benchmark, (b) and (e) illustrate the differences between the RL and the smoothed best response (BR), while (c) and
(f) show the gaps between the RL and the aspiration-based rule (Aspiration). The population structure is a lattice
network (see Supporting Information Figs. S1–S4 for other population structures with different network degrees).
Parameter values: N = 400, d = 5, β = 0.01, C = c = 1.0, T = [d/2] + 1, Bs = 12, rs = 3.0 for the PGG, and
rs = 4.0 for the TPGG.
tragedy of the commons (i.e., a PGG is played), whereas s2 be the degraded state where envi-
ronmental resources are gradually depleted. In any state of the environment, cooperation is an
altruistic behavior that will increase the common-pool resources, whereas defection is a selfish
behavior that will lead the common-pool resources to be consumed. Furthermore, the state of
common-pool resources (i.e., the environmental state) will conversely affect individual behav-
iors. To characterize this feedback relation, we here adopt the difference form of the replicator
dynamics with environmental feedbacks [19, 22] to describe the evolution of the average time
proportion of state s1,
∆z(t) = ηz(t)(1− z(t))(xC(t)− x¯C), (16)
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where η denotes the positive step-size, xC(t) is the proportion of C players in the population at
time t, and x¯C is the tipping point of the proportion of C players. If the proportion of C players
xC(t) is above the tipping point x¯C, it means that the number of cooperators is competent to
sustain the supply of the common-pool resources. At the same time, the environment will also
be more likely to stay in the prosperous state s1, leading z(t) to increase. Otherwise, cooperators
will be insufficient and the public resources will be continuously consumed. In this case, z(t)
will decrease as the environment will more frequently stay in the degraded state s2.
In Fig. 4, we consider that in the prosperous state s1 players play a PGG. However, in the
degraded state s2, one of the four different games, the PGG, IPGG (inverse public goods game,
which reverses the payoffs of action C and D in the PGG), dSH (d-player stag hunt game, which
is a variant of the TPGG, and whose only difference from the TPGG is that cooperators always
entail a cost c even if j < T), and dSD, is played. The reason that we select these four types of
games is twofold. On the one hand, they are commonly used to mimic the essence of a vast num-
ber of real-life group interactions [12]; on the other hand, they encompass all possible evolution-
ary behaviors for the frequency-dependent selection between C and D under the classic replicator
dynamics [9]: D dominance, C dominance, bistability, and coexistence (see Fig. 4). Through
agent-based simulations, in Fig. 4, we show the co-evolutionary dynamics of cooperation and
environmental states under moderate selection intensity. Depending on the game type and the
value of the tipping point x¯C, the population emerges various dynamic behaviors. Particularly,
although our model is stochastic and incorporates the effect of environment and learning, we can
still observe those dominance, bistability, and coexistence behaviors analogously obtained under
the deterministic replicator dynamics. In addition, when replicator dynamics predict that coop-
eration will be the dominant choice in the degraded state s2, our results show some persistent
oscillations between cooperation and the environment (panel I in Fig. 4).
3.3.2 External incentives
Another interesting case is the existence of external incentives, which will undermine the sta-
tionarity of the payoff structure of the game. Like two sides of a coin, reward and punishment
are two diametrically opposed external incentives for sustaining human cooperation [61, 62, 63].
The former is a type of positive incentives where players who cooperate will get an additional
benefit, while the latter is a kind of negative incentives where those who defect will be sanctioned
and pay a fine. At a certain moment during the evolution of cooperation, we separately imple-
ment punishment and reward, or jointly enforce them to all players in the population with four
environmental states. We find that both punishment and reward are effective tools in promoting
cooperation, even if the game environment may change (see Fig. 5).
4 Discussion
In natural populations, the biotic and abiotic environment where organisms are exposed persists
variations in time and space. To win the struggle for survival in this uncertain world, organ-
isms have to timely adjust their behaviors in response to the fluctuation of their living envi-
ronments [24, 36]. For the longstanding conundrum of how cooperation can evolve, however,
the majority of the existing evolutionary interpretations has been devoted to understanding the
14
ĉIPGGĊdSH
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Figure 4: Co-evolutionary dynamics of cooperation and the environment under moderate selection intensity. In
each panel, sub-figures for the gradient of selection are obtained by replicator dynamics [9, 58, 60]. The direction of
evolution is indicated by arrows. Blue solid circles are used to depict stable equilibria, while open blue circles are
used to depict unstable equilibria. From panel I to panel IV, the IPGG, dSH, PGG, and dSD are used, respectively,
to specify the normal-form game played in state s2. In state s1, players participate in a PGG. The phase graphs in
each panel show the co-evolutionary dynamics of the average proportion of C players and the time proportion of the
PGG for different value intervals of the tipping point x¯C. Corresponding to the value interval 0 < x¯C < 1, the first
row in panel I shows the persistent oscillations of cooperation and the environment. The bottom right sub-figure
in panel I shows the linear relation between the average abundance of C players and the average time proportion
of the PGG, which suggests that condition (12) is still effective for relatively moderate selection intensity to some
extent. The first row in panel II corresponds to the case where there is a stable and an unstable interior equilibrium
under replicator dynamics (the bottom left), whereas the second row corresponds to the case where there is a unique
interior unstable equilibrium (the bottom right). The population structure is finite and well-mixed. Parameter values:
N = 400, d = 5, β = 2, C = c = 1.0, Bs = 12.0, rs = 3.0 for all panels, except, in panel II, rs = 4.0 and T = 3
for the first row, and rs = 5.01 and T = 4.0 for the second row.
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Figure 5: Evolution of cooperation under the influence of external incentives. Light solid lines indicate simulations
whereas dash dot lines correspond to analytical results. During the evolution, we separately implement punishment
and reward, or jointly enforce them to all players in the population with four environmental states, where in each
state, one of the IPGG, dSH, PGG, and dSD is played. One can observe that these external incentives markedly
enhance the abundance of C players in the population. The population structure is a lattice network. Parameter
values: N = 400, d = 5, β = 0.05, C = c = 1.0 for all games, except rs = 3.0 for the PGG and TPGG, rs = 5.0
and T = [d/2] + 2 for the dSH, and Bs = 12 for the dSD.
static interactive scenarios [1, 6]. Therefore, when individual interactions, especially involving
multiple players at a time, occur in the changing environment, determining whether coopera-
tion can evolve will become fairly tricky. Here, we developed a general model framework that
incorporates an adaptation mechanism of reinforcement learning to investigate the evolution of
cooperative behaviors in the constantly changing multi-player game environment. Our model
not only considers the interplay between players’ behaviors and environmental variations, but
also incorporates a cognitive or psychological feedback loop where players’ choices determine
the game outcome, and in turn are affected by it. Such a setup is, to some extent, analogous to
the human decision in the context of the hybrid human-machine cooperation [64], a key research
theme in the emerging interdisciplinary field – machine behavior [65], in which humans can use
algorithms to make decisions and subsequently the training of the same algorithms is affected by
those decisions.
The importance of environmental variations in population dynamics has long been recognized
in theoretical ecology and population biology [23, 24, 25]. In a realistic social or ecological sys-
tem, individual behaviors and environmental variations are inevitably coupled together [23, 24].
By consuming, transforming, or producing common-pool resources, for example, organisms are
enabled to alter their living environments, and consequently, such modification may consequen-
tially be detrimental or beneficial to their survival [21]. Our analytical condition for determining
whether cooperation can be favored over defection indeed provides us a plausible theoretical ex-
planation for this phenomenon. If mutual actions of individuals lead the environment to transit
from a preferable state where cooperation is more profitable to a hostile one where defection
is more dominant, cooperation will be suppressed. Otherwise, cooperation will flourish. In
particular, if the population has access to switching among multiple environmental states, the
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environment will play the role of intermediates in social interactions and the final outcome of
whether cooperation can evolve will be the synthesis of results in each environmental state. Such
an observation is different from the recent findings where game transitions can result in a more
favorable outcome for cooperation even if all individual games favor defection [20, 28]. One
important reason for this is that we do not follow the scheme to explicitly assign how the en-
vironment depends on individual actions to transit from one state to another, but rather use an
ergodic Markov chain to characterize the dynamics of the environment. Thus, in this sense, our
model is more general and can be applied to a large variety of environmental transition processes.
Moreover, compared with the existing studies on the evolution of cooperation in the changing
environment [19, 20, 22, 27, 28, 29], another striking difference is that, apart from the environ-
mental feedback, our model introduces the learning mechanism of reinforcement. Since, when
the environment changes, the previous decision-making scheme adopted by individuals may fail
to work, they must learn how to adjust their behaviors in response to the contingencies given
by the environment, in order to obtain a higher fitness. Such a scenario is also closely related to
some recent work across disciplines, including statistical physics [46, 66, 67, 68, 69], artificial in-
telligence [41, 54, 70], evolutionary biology [71, 72], and neuroscience [40, 73]. However, their
dominant attention has been paid to learning dynamics, the deterministic limit of the learning
process, the design of new learning algorithms in games, or neural computations. In comparison,
our model is discrete and stochastic, and focuses on multi-player stochastic games. In particu-
lar, our analysis for the game system is systematic and encompasses a variety of factors, such
as group interactions, spatial structures, and environmental variations. In addition, our work
may offer some new insight into the interface between reinforcement learning and evolutionary
game theory from the perspective of approximate solution methods [41], because most existing
progress in combining tools from these two fields to explore the interaction of multiple agents is
based on the tabular solution methods [46, 54, 69, 70].
In the present work, one of the main limitations is that the strategic update is restricted to
the asynchronous type and the learning experience is required to be shared across individuals.
Although such a setup is appropriate in those scenarios where individuals modify their strategies
independently, and typical in economics applications and for overlapping generations [11], it has
been suggested that the unanimous satisfactory decisions reached by all individuals based on
asynchronous updates cannot always be guaranteed by synchronous updates [74]. In particular,
if individuals are able to communicate with each other via a network or leverage the perceived
information to model and infer the choices of others [42, 44, 73], the asynchronous update will
become more problematic. Thus, further work on synchronously strategic revisions is worthy of
exploring in the future. Of course, such an extension will also be full of challenges, because up-
dating strategies simultaneously for multiple agents will inevitably give rise to some intractable
problems, such as the curse of dimensionality, requirement for coordination, nonstationarity, and
exploration-exploitation tradeoff [42]. Moreover, some further efforts should be invested in the
partial observability of the Markov environmental states and relaxing the perfect environmental
information required in our model to the local or unpredictable type [75].
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Supporting Information
SI.1 Algorithm derivation for the actor-critic reinforcement learning
Here, we derive the algorithm of the actor-critic reinforcement learning adopted in our model,
using the method proposed in Refs. [47, 48]. First, we define the state value function Vπ(s, j)
under the policy π for a given state pair, s and j, by Vπ(s, j) , ∑a∈A π(s, j, a; θ, β)Q
π (s, j, a),
∀s ∈ S and j ∈ J , and let ρ(π) be the performance measure of policy π with respect to the
policy parameter θ. The goal of the actor-critic reinforcement learning is to seek to maximize
the performance. Thus, the policy parameter is updated in the direction of the gradient ascent of
ρ(π),
θt+1 = θt + γt
∂ρ(π)
∂θt
, (SI.1)
where γt is the positive step size. It is clear that if this iteration can be achieved, θt will be
assured to converge to the local optimum of ρ(π). In the following, we proceed to derive an
unbiased estimator of the gradient
∂ρ(π)
∂θ .
Using the definition of Qπ(s, j, a), we first have
Qπ(s, j, a) =
∞
∑
t=1
E{rt − ρ(π)|s0 = s, j0 = j, a0 = a,π}
= ∑
s′∈S ,j′∈J
Pr(s′, j′|s, j, a)[Ras,j − ρ(π)
+ ∑
a∈A
π(s′, j′, a; θ, β)
∞
∑
t=1
E{rt − ρ(π)|s0 = s
′, j0 = j
′, a0 = a,π}]
= Ras,j − ρ(π) + ∑
s′∈S ,j′∈J
Pr(s′, j′|s, j, a) ∑
a∈A
π(s′, j′, a; θ, β)Qπ(s′, j′, a)
= Ras,j − ρ(π) + ∑
s′∈S ,j′∈J
Pr(s′, j′|s, j, a)Vπ(s′, j′),
(SI.2)
where Pr(s′, j′|s, j, a) is the probability that executing action a ∈ A leads the current state pair
(s, j) to transit to (s′, j′) in the next time. Then, the derivative of Vπ(s, j) with respect to θ can
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be calculated by
∂Vπ(s, j)
∂θ
=
∂
∂θ ∑
a∈A
π(s, j, a; θ, β)Qπ (s, j, a),
= ∑
a∈A
[
∂π(s, j, a; θ, β)
∂θ
Qπ(s, j, a) + π(s, j, a; θ, β)
∂Qπ(s, j, a)
∂θ
]
= ∑
a∈A
[
∂π(s, j, a; θ, β)
∂θ
Qπ(s, j, a)+
π(s, j, a; θ, β)
∂
∂θ
(
Ras,j − ρ(π) + ∑
s′∈S ,j′∈J
Pr(s′, j′|s, j, a)Vπ(s′, j′)
)]
= ∑
a∈A
[
∂π(s, j, a; θ, β)
∂θ
Qπ(s, j, a)+
π(s, j, a; θ, β)
(
−
∂ρ(π)
∂θ
+ ∑
s′∈S ,j′∈J
Pr(s′, j′|s, j, a)
∂Vπ(s′, j′)
∂θ
)]
.
(SI.3)
Therefore, it leads to
∂ρ(π)
∂θ
= ∑
a∈A
[
∂π(s, j, a; θ, β)
∂θ
Qπ(s, j, a) + π(s, j, a; θ, β) ∑
s′∈S ,j′∈J
Pr(s′, j′|s, j, a)
∂Vπ(s′, j′)
∂θ
]
−
∂Vπ(s, j)
∂θ
.
(SI.4)
Multiplying both sides of the equation by dπ(s)p·j and summing over s ∈ S and j ∈ J yield
∑
s∈S
dπ(s) ∑
j∈J
p·j
∂ρ(π)
∂θ
= ∑
s∈S
dπ(s) ∑
j∈J
p·j ∑
a∈A
∂π(s, j, a; θ, β)
∂θ
Qπ(s, j, a)
+ ∑
s∈S
dπ(s) ∑
j∈J
p·j ∑
a∈A
π(s, j, a; θ, β) ∑
s′∈S ,j′∈J
Pr(s′, j′|s, j, a)
∂Vπ(s′, j′)
∂θ
− ∑
s∈S
dπ(s) ∑
j∈J
p·j
∂Vπ(s, j)
∂θ
.
(SI.5)
In addition, note that ∑s∈S d
π(s)∑ j∈J p·j = 1 and ∑s∈S d
π(s)∑ j∈J p·j ∑a∈A π(s, j, a; θ, β)
Pr(s′, j′|s, j, a) = Pr(s′, j′), where Pr(s′, j′) is the joint probability that the environmental state
is s′ and the focal player will, on average, encounter j′ opponents taking action C among d − 1
co-players in the stationary state. Further, since s′ and j′ are independent, we have Pr(s′ , j′) =
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dπ(s′)p·j′ . It follows that Eq. (SI.5) can be rewritten as
∂ρ(π)
∂θ
= ∑
s∈S
dπ(s) ∑
j∈J
p·j ∑
a∈A
∂π(s, j, a; θ, β)
∂θ
Qπ(s, j, a)
+ ∑
s′∈S ,j′∈J
dπ(s′)p·j′
∂Vπ(s′, j′)
∂θ
− ∑
s∈S
dπ(s) ∑
j∈J
p·j
∂Vπ(s, j)
∂θ
= ∑
s∈S
dπ(s) ∑
j∈J
p·j ∑
a∈A
∂π(s, j, a; θ, β)
∂θ
Qπ(s, j, a)
= ∑
s∈S
dπ(s) ∑
j∈J
p·j ∑
a∈A
π(s, j, a; θ, β)
∇θπ(s, j, a; θ, β)
π(s, j, a; θ, β)
Qπ(s, j, a)
= Eπ
[
∇θπ(s, j, a; θ, β)
π(s, j, a; θ, β)
Qπ(s, j, a)
]
,
(SI.6)
where Eπ(·) represents the expectation under the policy π, and ∇θ ,
∂
∂θ . Hence, Eq. (SI.6)
gives an unbiased estimator of
∂ρ(π)
∂θ .
From Eq. (SI.6), we know that the unbiased estimator of
∂ρ(π)
∂θ depends on Q
π(s, j, a). How-
ever, an exact calculation of Qπ(s, j, a) is usually impossible. One effective way to deal with
this problem is to find a good approximation of this value function [41]. Let fw(s, j, a) :
S × J × A → R be the approximation to Qπ(s, j, a), with the parameter vector w ∈ RL.
To obtain fw(s, j, a), it is natural to update w under the policy π by the least square method,
∆wt ∝ −
∂ ‖ Qˆπ(s, j, a)− fwt(s, j, a) ‖
2
π
∂wt
,
∝ ∑
s∈S
dπ(s) ∑
j∈J
p·j ∑
a∈A
π(s, j, a; θ, β)[Qˆπ (s, j, a)− fwt(s, j, a)]∇wt fwt(s, j, a),
∝ Eπ
{
[Qˆπ(s, j, a)− fwt(s, j, a)]∇wt fwt(s, j, a)
}
,
(SI.7)
where “∝” is the proportional symbol, ‖ Qˆπ(s, j, a) − fwt(s, j, a) ‖
2
π defines the distance using
the norm ‖Q(s, j, a)‖2π = ∑s∈S d
π(s)∑ j∈J p·j ∑a∈A π(s, j, a; θ, β)[Q(s, j, a)]
2 , Qˆπ(s, j, a) is
the unbiased estimator of Qπ(s, j, a), and∇wt ,
∂
∂wt
. When this iterative process has converged
to a local optimum, we have
Eπ {[Q
π(s, j, a)− fw(s, j, a)]∇w fw(s, j, a)} = 0. (SI.8)
In our model, since fw(s, j, a) is given in a linear form of features and satisfies the canonical
compatible condition [47] ∇w fw(s, j, a) =
∇θπ(s,j,a;θ,β)
π(s,j,a;θ,β)
(see Eq. (6)), subtracting Eq. (SI.8)
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from Eq. (SI.6) yields
∂ρ(π)
∂θ
= Eπ
[
∇θπ(s, j, a; θ, β)
π(s, j, a; θ, β)
Qπ(s, j, a)
]
−Eπ {[Q
π(s, j, a)− fw(s, j, a)]∇w fw(s, j, a)} ,
= Eπ
[
∇θπ(s, j, a; θ, β)
π(s, j, a; θ, β)
fw(s, j, a)
]
.
(SI.9)
Next, based on the temporal-difference learning [41], Eqs. (SI.1) and (SI.7) can be written as
Eq. (7). Particularly, when the conditions required for the learning step-sizes in Eq. (7) are
satisfied, the algorithm is able to be guaranteed to converge to a local optimum of ρ(π) by
applying the stochastic approximation theorem [49, 50].
SI.2 Deriving the condition for cooperation to be favored
In this section, we derive the condition under which the average abundance of C players, 〈xC〉,
is more abundant than that of D players in the limit of weak selection, when the population has
reached the stationary state. Mathematically, this problem is equivalent to find the condition
for 〈xC〉 = ∑n∈N (xn · n/N) > 1/2 to be true when β → 0, where xn is the stationary
probability that there are n players of C in the population. As mentioned in Methods, to obtain
xn, we need to calculate the stationary distribution X = [xn]1×(N+1), n ∈ N , which is the
unique solution to X(P∗ − I) = 0N+1 and ∑n∈N xn = 1, where P
∗ = [p∗u,v](N+1)×(N+1) is
the probability transition matrix. From this equation, we know that each xn will be a rational
polynomial function of p∗u,v, u, v ∈ N . In addition, we note that p
∗
u,v is differentiable at β = 0
based on Eqs. (1) and (9). It follows that the stationary probability xn is differentiable at β = 0.
In this case, we rewrite xn in terms of the first-order Taylor expansion under weak selection
β → 0, xn = xn(0) + x′n(0) · β+ o(β), where x
′
n(0) =
∂xn(β)
∂β |β=0. Substituting xn into 〈xC〉,
we then obtain
〈xC〉 =
1
N ∑
n∈N
nxn(0) + β
1
N ∑
n∈N
nx′n(0) + o(β). (SI.10)
Particularly, we note that the first term on the right-hand side of this equation is in fact the
average abundance of C players in the population when selection is neutral, i.e., β = 0. Thus, in
the following, we first prove that in the case of neutral selection β = 0, the average abundance
of C players is one half, i.e., 1N ∑n∈N nxn(0) = 1/2. Subsequently, we prove that x
′
n(0) will
be a linear combination of aj(s) and bj(s), ∀j ∈ J and ∀s ∈ S . Finally, substituting them
into (SI.10), we obtain the condition for cooperation to be favored.
SI.2.1 The average abundance of C players under neutral selection
When selection intensity is neutral, i.e., β = 0, we denote the strategic state of individual i in
the population by qi, where i belongs to the set {1, 2, . . . , N} whose elements are the labels of
individuals. If individual i takes action C, we assign qi = 1, and otherwise qi = 0. Then, the
total number of C players in the population can be computed by ∑Ni=1 qi. Since the policy used by
the focal player to determine whether to cooperate or defect is a probability distribution function
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over actions, qi is a random variable. In particular, when selection is neutral β = 0, every
individual chosen as the focal player will take action C or D at random, because π(s, j, C; θ, 0) =
π(s, j, D; θ, 0) = 1/2 for any s ∈ S , j ∈ J , and θ ∈ RL. Thus, the expectation of qi, E(qi),
will always be 1/2. As a consequence, the average abundance of C players in the population,
∑
N
i=1 E(qi)/N, will be one half. This is equivalent to say
1
N ∑
n∈N
nxn(0) = 1/2. (SI.11)
SI.2.2 The linear relation
We proceed to prove that x′n(0) can be written by a linear combination of aj(s) and bj(s), ∀j ∈ J
and ∀s ∈ S , with a constant term. First, we rewrite the policy π(s, j, a; θ, β) in terms of the first-
order Taylor expansion under weak selection, given by
π(s, j, a; θ, β) = π(s, j, a; θ, 0) +
∂π(s, j, a; θ, β)
∂β
|β=0 · β+ o(β)
= 1/2+
|A|θTφs,j,a −∑b∈A θ
Tφs,j,b
|A|2
β+ o(β),
(SI.12)
where |A| represents the cardinality of action setA. Next, we define an error function ew(s, j, a) =
Qπ(s, j, a)− fw(s, j, a). In this way, we have fw(s, j, a) = Qπ(s, j, a)− ew(s, j, a). In addition,
based on Eqs. (3), (4), and (5), we note that Qπ(s, j, a) can be written as a linear combination of
aj(s) and bj(s), j ∈ J and s ∈ S , without containing any constant terms. Thus, for every Q-
value function Qπ(s, j, a), there will always exist a set of coefficients, µsl(s, j, a) and νsl(s, j, a),
such that Qπ(s, j, a) = ∑s′∈S ,j′∈J [µs′ j′(s, j, a)aj′(s
′) + νs′ j′(s, j, a)bj′ (s
′)]. Substituting it into
fw(s, j, a) = Q
π(s, j, a) − ew(s, j, a), we have fw(s, j, a) = ∑s′∈S ,j′∈J [µs′ j′(s, j, a)aj′(s
′) +
νs′ j′(s, j, a)bj′(s
′)] − ew(s, j, a). On the other hand, based on Eq. (6), we can get fw(s, j, a) =
wT[φs,j,a −∑b∈A π(s, j, b; θ, β)φs,j,b]β. It follows that
wT[φs,j,a − ∑
b∈A
π(s, j, b; θ, β)φs,j,b]β
= ∑
s′∈S ,j′∈J
[µs′ j′(s, j, a)aj′(s
′) + νs′ j′(s, j, a)bj′ (s
′)]− ew(s, j, a),
(SI.13)
for any w ∈ RL.
From this equation, we can find that the term on the left-hand side is a linear combination
of φs,j,C and φs,j,D without constant terms, whereas that on the right-hand side is a linear com-
bination of aj(s) and bj(s), j ∈ J and s ∈ S , with a constant term ew(s, j, a). It implies that
every element of vector φs,j,a, a ∈ A, is able to be written as a linear combination of aj(s) and
bj(s), j ∈ J and s ∈ S , with a constant term proportional to ew(s, j, a). Thus,
|A|φs,j,a−∑b∈A φs,j,b
|A|2
will be a vector whose each element is a linear combination of aj(s) and bj(s) with a con-
stant term proportional to ew(s, j, a). In particular, we use all aj(s) to construct the vector A =
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[a(s1), a(s2), . . . , a(sM)]T, and all bj(s) to construct the vector B = [b(s
1), b(s2), . . . , b(sM)]T,
where a(sk) = [a0(s
k), a1(s
k), . . . , ad−1(s
k)] and b(sk) = [bd−1(s
k), bd−2(s
k), . . . , b0(s
k)],
k = 1, 2, . . . , M. Then, there will exist two coefficient matrixes, Us,j,a and Vs,j,a, and a constant
vector, Fs,j,a, such that
|A|φs,j,a−∑b∈A φs,j,b
|A|2
= Us,j,aA + Vs,j,aB + Fs,j,a for a group of given s ∈ S ,
j ∈ J , and a ∈ A, where every element of Fs,j,a is proportional to ew(s, j, a). In this case,
Eq. (SI.12) can be written by
π(s, j, a; θ, β) = 1/2+
|A|θTφs,j,a −∑b∈A θ
Tφs,j,b
|A|2
β+ o(β),
= 1/2+

θTUs,j,aA + θTVs,j,aB︸ ︷︷ ︸
m(s,j,a;θ)
+ θTFs,j,a︸ ︷︷ ︸
c(s,j,a;θ)

 β+ o(β),
= 1/2+ [m(s, j, a; θ) + c(s, j, a; θ)]β + o(β).
(SI.14)
In particular, if one defines a function p¯u,v(π(s, j, a; θ∗ , β)) by
p¯u,v(π(s, j, a; θ
∗ , β)) = ∑
j∈J


pC pC,jπ(s, j, C; θ
∗, β) + pD pD,jπ(s, j, D; θ
∗, β), for v = u;
pC pC,jπ(s, j, D; θ
∗, β), for v = u− 1;
pD pD,jπ(s, j, C; θ
∗, β), for v = u + 1;
0, otherwise;
(SI.15)
then p∗u,v can be given by p
∗
u,v = ∑s∈S d
π(s)p¯u,v(π(s, j, a; θ∗ , β)) based on Eq. (9). Substituting
Eq. (SI.14) into it eventually leads to
p∗u,v = ∑
s∈S
dπ(s)p¯u,v(1/2+ [m(s, j, a; θ
∗) + c(s, j, a; θ∗)]β+ o(β)). (SI.16)
To obtain the long-run distribution X = [xn]1×(N+1), n ∈ N , we start to figure out the
equations X(P∗ − I) = 0N+1 and ∑n∈N xn = 1. First, we note that P
∗ is a stochastic matrix
because ∑v∈N p
∗
u,v = ∑s∈S d
π(s)∑v∈N p¯u,v(π(s, j, a; θ
∗ , β)) = ∑s∈S d
π(s) = 1 for ∀u ∈ N
and p∗u,v ≥ 0 for ∀u, v ∈ N . Moreover, P
∗ is primitive because any two states of the Markov
chain described by the probability transition matrix P∗ are accessible to each other, i.e., (P∗)κ >
0 for some positive integers κ. Then, the Perron-Frobenius theorem [76] ensures that 1 is its
largest eigenvalue and the corresponding eigenvector with all entries summing to 1 is the unique
stationary distribution that we want to seek. That is, the solution to equations X(P∗− I) = 0N+1
and ∑n∈N xn = 1 will have only one degree of freedom. Without loss of generality, we assume
that it is xN. Then, there will exist a set of coefficients, hς, ς = 0, 1, 2, . . . , N − 1, such that
xς = hςxN, for ς = 0, 1, 2, . . . , N − 1. (SI.17)
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Furthermore, since the stationary distribution is a vector with all entries summing to 1, we have
xN(1+ h0 + h1 + . . .+ hN−1) = 1. (SI.18)
On the other hand, based on Eqs. (SI.15) and (SI.16), we can find that after performing the
Gaussian elimination, the elements of the reduced matrix of P∗ − I will be polynomials of β,
and whenever we have a degree κ term in β, it must be accompanied by a degree κ term in
∑s∈S d
π(s)[m(s, j, a; θ∗) + c(s, j, a; θ∗)]. In view of the nature of the Gaussian elimination,
it implies that all hς, ς = 0, 1, 2, . . . , N − 1 will be rational functions of β. Then, based on
Eqs. (SI.17) and (SI.18), we can obtain that every xn, n ∈ N , will be a rational function of β.
Without loss of generality, we write it in an irreducible form by
xn =
ℓ0n + ℓ1nβ+ o(β)
λ0n + λ1nβ+ o(β)
, ∀n ∈ N , (SI.19)
where ℓ0n and λ0n are constant terms which are independent of ∑s∈S d
π(s)m(s, j, a; θ∗) and
∑s∈S d
π(s)c(s, j, a; θ∗), whereas ℓ1n and λ1n are linear combinations of ∑s∈S d
π(s)m(s, j, a; θ∗)
and ∑s∈S d
π(s)c(s, j, a; θ∗), respectively. Accordingly, the first-order derivative of xn at β = 0
can be given by
x′n(0) =
ℓ1nλ0n − ℓ0nλ1n
λ2
0n
, ∀n ∈ N . (SI.20)
From this equation, we know that x′n(0) will be a linear combination of ∑s∈S d
π(s)m(s, j, a; θ∗)
and ∑s∈S d
π(s)c(s, j, a; θ∗). That is, there will exist a set of coefficients, kj,a and gj,a, such that
∑
n∈N
nx′n(0) = ∑
j∈J
∑
a∈A
[kj,a ∑
s∈S
dπ(s)m(s, j, a; θ∗) + gj,a ∑
s∈S
dπ(s)c(s, j, a; θ∗)]. (SI.21)
Based on Eqs. (SI.10) and (SI.11), it follows that 〈xC〉 > 1/2 under weak selection if and only
if
∑
j∈J
∑
a∈A
[kj,a ∑
s∈S
dπ(s)m(s, j, a; θ∗) + gj,a ∑
s∈S
dπ(s)c(s, j, a; θ∗)] > 0. (SI.22)
SI.2.3 The final condition
Based on the results we obtain above, we here give the final condition for cooperation to be
favored in a simple form of payoff entries, aj(s) and bj(s). First, based on Eq. (SI.14), we
substitute m(s, j, a; θ∗) = θ∗TUs,j,aA + θ
∗T
Vs,j,aB and c(s, j, a; θ
∗) = θ∗TFs,j,a into Eq. (SI.21).
It leads to
∑
n∈N
nx′n(0) = ∑
j∈J
∑
a∈A
{
kj,a ∑
s∈S
dπ(s)
[
θ∗TUs,j,aA + θ
∗T
Vs,j,aB
]
+ gj,a ∑
s∈S
dπ(s)θ∗T Fs,j,a
}
.
(SI.23)
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Let Φs = ∑j∈J ∑a∈A kj,aUs,j,a, Ψs = ∑j∈J ∑a∈A kj,aVs,j,a, and e = ∑j∈J ∑a∈A gj,a ∑s∈S
dπ(s)θ∗T Fs,j,a. Then, Eq. (SI.23) is changed to
∑
n∈N
nx′n(0) = ∑
s∈S
dπ(s)θ∗TΦs A + ∑
s∈S
dπ(s)θ∗TΨsB + e, (SI.24)
and meanwhile condition (SI.22) is changed to
∑
s∈S
dπ(s)θ∗TΦs A + ∑
s∈S
dπ(s)θ∗TΨsB + e > 0. (SI.25)
Particularly, it is noteworthy that the strategic updating process described in our model is
symmetric for the two actions, C and D. That is, if we relabel the action notations (i.e., exchang-
ing C and D) and swap their corresponding payoff entries in Table 1 (i.e., exchanging ad−1−j(s)
and bj(s) for all j ∈ J and s ∈ S), it will result in symmetric dynamics [15, 55]. The reason is
that the unique difference between action C and D is fully captured by the payoff table, and the
population structure as well as the reinforcement learning algorithm do not introduce any distinc-
tions between these two actions. Then, based on Eqs. (SI.10), (SI.11), and (SI.24), we know that
the average abundance of D players, 〈xD〉, in the population, after enforcing the above swapping
operations, can be given by
〈xD〉 =
1
2
+
β
N
[
∑
s∈S
dπ(s)θ∗TΦsB + ∑
s∈S
dπ(s)θ∗TΨs A + e
]
+ o(β). (SI.26)
Accordingly, the average abundance of C players in the population is
〈xC〉 = 1− 〈xD〉
=
1
2
−
β
N
[
∑
s∈S
dπ(s)θ∗TΦsB + ∑
s∈S
dπ(s)θ∗TΨs A + e
]
+ o(β).
(SI.27)
It follows that 〈xC〉 > 1/2 if and only if
− ∑
s∈S
dπ(s)θ∗TΦsB− ∑
s∈S
dπ(s)θ∗TΨs A− e > 0. (SI.28)
Since both inequalities (SI.25) and (SI.28) are the condition under which 〈xC〉 is greater than
1/2 and they hold for any stationary distribution dπ(s), θ∗T ∈ RL, A ∈ RdM, and B ∈ RdM,
there must exist a positive scale factor ζ > 0 such that Φs = −ζΨs, Ψs = −ζΦs , and e = −ζe,
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for any s ∈ S . Then, we have ζ = 1 and e = 0. As a result, 〈xC〉 > 1/2 if and only if
∑
s∈S
dπ(s)θ∗TΦs A + ∑
s∈S
dπ(s)θ∗TΨsB + e
= ∑
s∈S
dπ(s)θ∗TΦs A− ∑
s∈S
dπ(s)θ∗TΦsB
= ∑
s∈S
dπ(s)θ∗TΦs(A− B)
> 0.
(SI.29)
SI.3 Finite well-mixed populations and structured populations
In this part, using the mean-field approximation, we derive the condition for cooperation to
be favored in two specific population structures, finite well-mixed populations and structured
populations, in the limit of weak selection and large population size.
SI.3.1 Finite well-mixed populations
In a finite and well-mixed population, the interactive links of individuals are described by a
complete graph. To obtain the stationary proportion of C players in the population, we first
calculate the probabilities that the number of C players at time τ, nτ , increases by one and
decreases by one, which are given by
T+(nτ = n) = ∑
s∈S
the environmental
state is s at time τ︷ ︸︸ ︷
Pr{sτ = s|s0,π}
a focal player
of D is chosen︷ ︸︸ ︷
N − n
N
d−1
∑
j=0
there are j co-
players of C︷ ︸︸ ︷
(nj)(
N−1−n
d−1−j )
(N−1d−1 )
the focal player
changes action to C︷ ︸︸ ︷
π(s, j, C; θτ , β), (SI.30)
and
T−(nτ = n) = ∑
s∈S
the environmental
state is s at time τ︷ ︸︸ ︷
Pr{sτ = s|s0,π}
a focal player
of C is chosen︷︸︸︷
n
N
d−1
∑
j=0
there are j co-
players of C︷ ︸︸ ︷
(n−1j )(
N−n
d−1−j)
(N−1d−1 )
the focal player
changes action to D︷ ︸︸ ︷
π(s, j, D; θτ , β), (SI.31)
respectively. Then, the master equation describing the evolutionary dynamics of the number of
C players can be given by
P(nτ+1 = n)− P(nτ = n) = T
+(nτ = n− 1)P(nτ = n− 1)
+ T−(nτ = n + 1)P(nτ = n + 1)− [T
+(nτ = n) + T
−(nτ = n)]P(nτ = n),
(SI.32)
where P(nτ = n) is the probability that the population contains n players of C at time τ. Next,
to perform the diffusion approximation [77, 78] to the master equation for sufficiently large
population size N ≫ 1, we scale τ by N, denoted by t = τ/N, and introduce y = n/N and
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the probability density f (y, t) = NP(nτ = n). Then, the master equation (SI.32) is changed to
f (y, t + 1/N)− f (y, t) = T+(y− 1/N) f (y − 1/N, t)
+ T−(y + 1/N) f (y + 1/N, t)− [T+(y) + T−(y)] f (y, t).
(SI.33)
For N ≫ 1, we expand the probability densities and transition probabilities in Eq. (SI.33) in a
Taylor series at y and t. Neglecting higher order terms in 1/N , we obtain
∂
∂t
f (y, t) = −
∂
∂y
[ϕ(y) f (y, t)] +
1
2
∂2
∂y2
[ψ2(y) f (y, t)], (SI.34)
where ϕ(y) = T+(y) − T−(y) is the drift term and ψ(y) =
√
[T+(y) + T−(y)]/N is the
diffusion term. Note that this equation has the form of the Fokker-Planck equation [77], and
the internal noise of the system is not correlated because successive update steps are mutually
independent. Then, the Itoˆ calculus can be applied to derive the Langevin equation [77] y˙ =
ϕ(y) + ψ(y)̺, where ̺ is the uncorrelated Gaussian noise. In particular, it is worth noting that
for sufficiently large population size N → ∞, the diffusion term ψ(y) will vanish. Therefore,
in this case, the dynamics describing the evolution of the proportion of C players reduce to a
deterministic differential equation,
y˙ = T+(y)− T−(y)
= ∑
s∈S
Pr{st = s|s0,π}
[
(1− y)
d−1
∑
j=0
H(y, j)π(s, j, C; θt , β)
−y
d−1
∑
j=0
H(y, j)π(s, j, D; θt , β)
]
,
(SI.35)
where H(y, j) , (d−1j )y
j(1− y)d−1−j is the binomial distribution used for approximating the
hypergeometric distribution,
H(y, j) ≈
(nj)(
N−1−n
d−1−j )
(N−1d−1 )
≈
(n−1j )(
N−n
d−1−j)
(N−1d−1 )
, (SI.36)
for sufficiently large N.
On the other hand, note that when θt is updated via the actor-critic reinforcement learning
algorithm, Eq. (7), it will almost surely converge to the equilibrium of the following dynamic
equations by applying stochastic approximation theory [49],
εw˙t = −
∂ ‖ Qπ(s, j, a)− fwt(s, j, a) ‖
2
π
∂wt
,
θ˙t =
∂ρ(π)
∂θt
,
(SI.37)
where ε is a sufficiently small perturbation parameter. Combining these two evolutionary pro-
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cesses together, a complete expression of the system dynamics for N ≫ 1 can be given by

y˙ = ∑s∈S Pr{st = s|s0,π}∑
d−1
j=0 H(y, j)
[(1− y)π(s, j, C; θt , β)− yπ(s, j, D; θt, β)] ,
εw˙t = −
∂‖Qπ(s,j,a)− fwt(s,j,a)‖
2
π
∂wt
,
θ˙t =
∂ρ(π)
∂θt
.
(SI.38)
From this equation, one can find that the dynamics of the reinforcement learning algorithm are
independent of the evolution of the proportion of C players, but it is not true in turn. Based on the
analysis in the Supporting Information SI.1, we know that θt will converge to a local optimum of
ρ(π), denoted by θ∗ (i.e., the solution to θ˙t =
∂ρ(π)
∂θt
= 0). Then, we can obtain the equilibrium
of the proportion of C players, y∗, by solving y˙ = 0 when θt has converged and the environment
has evolved to the stationary state, that is,
∑
s∈S
dπ(s)
d−1
∑
j=0
H(y∗, j) [(1− y∗)π(s, j, C; θ∗ , β)− y∗π(s, j, D; θ∗, β)] = 0, (SI.39)
where dπ(s) = limt→∞ Pr{st = s|s0,π} is applied. Because the average proportion of C
players in the population always keeps one half under neutral selection (i.e., β = 0), the equi-
librium of the proportion of C players, y∗, can be written by 1/2 plus some perturbations
in the limit of weak selection, y∗ = 1/2 + ξβ + o(β), where ξ , ∂y
∗
∂β |β=0. Substituting
y∗ = 1/2+ ξβ+ o(β) andπ(s, j, a; θ∗ , β) = 1/2+
2θ∗Tφs,j,a−∑b∈A θ
∗Tφs,j,b
4
β+ o(β), for ∀a ∈ A
into Eq. (SI.39), we then get
∑
s∈S
dπ(s)
d−1
∑
j=0
H(y∗, j)
[
−ξβ+
θ∗T
4
(φs,j,C − φs,j,D)β+ o(β)
]
= 0. (SI.40)
Solving ξ leads to
ξ = ∑
s∈S
dπ(s)
d−1
∑
j=0
H(y∗, j)
θ∗T
4
[
φs,j,C − φs,j,D
]
,
= ∑
s∈S
dπ(s)
d−1
∑
j=0
[(
d− 1
j
)
1
2d−1
+ O(β)
]
θ∗T
4
[
φs,j,C − φs,j,D
]
,
= ∑
s∈S
dπ(s)
d−1
∑
j=0
(
d− 1
j
)
1
2d+1
θ∗T
[
φs,j,C − φs,j,D
]
.
(SI.41)
It follows that under weak selection and for large population size, y∗ = 1/2+ ξβ+ o(β) > 1/2
if and only if
∑
s∈S
dπ(s)
d−1
∑
j=0
(
d− 1
j
)
1
2d+1
θ∗T
[
φs,j,C − φs,j,D
]
> 0. (SI.42)
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SI.3.2 Structured populations
Here, we proceed to consider a structured population where the interactive links of individuals
are described by a regular graph with node degree d− 1. To capture the evolutionary dynamics
of the system, we begin with defining the number of C players by nt, and the proportion of C
players in the population by PC(t) = nt/N, at time t. Then, the probabilities that the proportion
of C players increases and decreases by 1/N when nt = n, can be given by
Pr(∆PC(t) =
1
N
) = ∑
s∈S
the environmental
state is s at time t︷ ︸︸ ︷
Pr{st = s|s0,π}
a focal player
of D is chosen︷ ︸︸ ︷
N − n
N
d−1
∑
j=0
there are j co-
players of C︷ ︸︸ ︷
G(qC|D, qD|D, j)
the focal player
changes action to C︷ ︸︸ ︷
π(s, j, C; θt, β),
(SI.43)
and
Pr(∆PC(t) = −
1
N
) = ∑
s∈S
the environmental
state is s at time t︷ ︸︸ ︷
Pr{st = s|s0,π}
a focal player
of C is chosen︷︸︸︷
n
N
d−1
∑
j=0
there are j co-
players of C︷ ︸︸ ︷
G(qC|C, qD|C, j)
the focal player
changes action to D︷ ︸︸ ︷
π(s, j, D; θt, β),
(SI.44)
respectively, where G(qC|a, qD|a, j) , (
d−1
j )q
j
C|a
q
d−1−j
D|a
, ∀a ∈ A, and qZ|Y denotes the con-
ditional probability for a Y player to have a Z neighbor on average, ∀Y, Z ∈ A, and satisfies
qC|a + qD|a = 1 for ∀a ∈ A. Since only the focal player can revise its action in one unit of time,
the time derivative of PC(t) can be given by [79]
P˙C(t) =
1
N
Pr(∆PC(t) =
1
N
)−
1
N
Pr(∆PC(t) = −
1
N
),
=
1
N ∑
s∈S
Pr{st = s|s0,π}
[
(1− PC(t))
d−1
∑
j=0
G(qC|D, qD|D, j)π(s, j, C; θt , β)
−PC(t)
d−1
∑
j=0
G(qC|C, qD|C, j)π(s, j, D; θt, β)
]
.
(SI.45)
Combining with the dynamics of the reinforcement learning, Eqs. (SI.37), we can then obtain
the system dynamics given by

P˙C(t) =
1
N ∑s∈S Pr{st = s|s0,π}
[
(1− PC(t))∑
d−1
j=0 G(qC|D, qD|D, j)π(s, j, C; θt , β)
−PC(t)∑
d−1
j=0 G(qC|C, qD|C, j)π(s, j, D; θt, β)
]
,
εw˙t = −
∂‖Qπ(s,j,a)− fwt(s,j,a)‖
2
π
∂wt
,
θ˙t =
∂ρ(π)
∂θt
.
(SI.46)
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Similar to the situation in well-mixed populations, the learning dynamics are independent of the
evolution of the proportion of C players. Thus, we can obtain the equilibrium of the proportion
of C players, P∗C, in structured populations, by solving P˙C(t) = 0 when θt has converged and the
environment has evolved to the stationary state, that is,
∑
s∈S
dπ(s)
[
(1− P∗C)
d−1
∑
j=0
G(qC|D, qD|D, j)π(s, j, C; θ
∗ , β)
−P∗C
d−1
∑
j=0
G(qC|C, qD|C, j)π(s, j, D; θ
∗, β)
]
= 0,
(SI.47)
where dπ(s) = limt→∞ Pr{st = s|s0,π} is applied. Under weak selection, we first expand P∗C
andπ(s, j, a; θ∗ , β) in the first-order Taylor series, P∗C = 1/2+ ǫβ+ o(β) and π(s, j, a; θ
∗, β) =
1/2 +
2θ∗Tφs,j,a−∑b∈A θ
∗Tφs,j,b
4
β + o(β), ∀a ∈ A, where ǫ ,
∂P∗C
∂β |β=0. Substituting them into
Eq. (SI.47) and solving ǫ, we then get
ǫ = ∑
s∈S
dπ(s)
d−1
∑
j=0
(
d− 1
j
)
1
2d+1
θ∗T
[
φs,j,C − φs,j,D
]
. (SI.48)
It follows that, under weak selection and for large population size, P∗C = 1/2+ ǫβ + o(β) >
1/2 if and only if
∑
s∈S
dπ(s)
d−1
∑
j=0
(
d− 1
j
)
1
2d+1
θ∗T
[
φs,j,C − φs,j,D
]
> 0. (SI.49)
Interestingly, this condition is identical to the inequality (SI.42), which, once again, confirms the
previous finding that there are no differences in the final condition for cooperation to be favored
under weak selection between complete graphs and regular graphs [59].
Particularly, we here highlight that conditions (SI.42) and (SI.49) are the specific forms of
condition (SI.29) in finite well-mixed and structured populations, respectively. First, note that
φs,j,a is a L-dimension vector which is handcrafted to characterize the feature when the focal
player takes action a given the environmental state s and the number of C players j among its d−
1 co-players, and L is usually chosen to be much smaller than the dimension of the environmental
state M for the sake of reducing dimensions. Then, for any a choice of φs,j,a, we can always find
two sets of matrices, Φs,j ∈ R
L×dM and Ψs,j ∈ R
L×dM, such that φs,j,C = Φs,j(A + h¯1) and
−φs,j,D = Ψs,j(B+ h¯1), where 1 is the dM-dimension vector with all element 1, and h¯ is a large
constant chosen to ensure that every element of A+ h¯1 and B+ h¯1 is greater than zero. Let Φs =
∑
d−1
j=0 (
d−1
j )
1
2d+1
Φs,j and Ψs = ∑
d−1
j=0 (
d−1
j )
1
2d+1
Ψs,j. Then, both Eq. (SI.42) and Eq. (SI.49) are
changed to ∑s∈S d
π(s)θ∗T [Φs(A + h¯1) + Ψs(B + h¯1)] > 0. Using the symmetric property of
the strategic updating and via a similar computational process as Eqs. (SI.26) – (SI.28), we can
obtain Φs = −Ψs. As a result, the proportion of C players in the population is higher than that
of D players if and only if ∑s∈S d
π(s)θ∗TΦs(A− B) > 0.
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SI.4 Smoothed best response updating and aspiration-based updating
In this section, we apply our model framework to study two non-learning updating processes, the
smoothed best response of the Fermi form and the aspiration-based rule, and derive the condition
for cooperation to be favored in the limit of weak selection.
If the focal player in our model updates actions per step via the smoothed best response of the
Fermi form, then the probability for the focal player to choose action a ∈ A is given by Eq. (13).
Under weak selection, its first-order Taylor expansion is given by
π(s, j, a; β) = 1/2+
Ras,j −R
b
s,j
4
β+ o(β), ∀s ∈ S , j ∈ J , a, b( 6= a) ∈ A. (SI.50)
In contrast, if the aspiration-based updating rule is adopted, the probability for the focal
player to switch to the new action a ∈ A will be given by Eq. (14). Analogously, in the limit of
weak selection, we can give its first-order Taylor expansion by
π(s, j, a; β) = 1/2+
Ras,j − E
4
β+ o(β), ∀s ∈ S , j ∈ J , a ∈ A. (SI.51)
In particular, if the aspiration level is not a fixed constant but a time-varying value, we will have
an adapting aspiration scheme,
π(s, j, a; β) =
1
1+ e
−β[Ras,j−E(t)]
, ∀s ∈ S , j ∈ J , a ∈ A. (SI.52)
To update the aspiration level, a simple rule ∆E(t) = ω[Ω − E(t)] can be adopted, where
0 < ω < 1 denotes the updating step-size and Ω specifies a desired aspiration. Compared with
the constant aspiration, this rule means that there are some noises or fluctuations for the desired
aspiration Ω during the evolution of cooperation, as the aspiration level will asymptotically con-
verge to the unique stable equilibrium, limt→+∞ E(t) = Ω. In particular, if Ω is set to be rt+1,
it will recover the learning rule used in adapting aspiration dynamics [80]. Once again, in the
equilibrium state, we give its first-order Taylor expansion under weak selection by
π(s, j, a; β) = 1/2+
Ras,j −Ω
4
β+ o(β), ∀s ∈ S , j ∈ J , a ∈ A. (SI.53)
SinceRas,j = aj(s) if a = C andR
a
s,j = bj(s) if a = D, as shown in Eqs. (4), we can always
find a set of coefficients µ˜(a) and ν˜(a) for Eq. (SI.50), (SI.51), or (SI.53) such that
π(s, j, a; β) = 1/2+

µ˜(a)aj(s) + ν˜(a)bj(s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
m˜(s,j,a)
+c˜(s, j, a)

 β+ o(β), (SI.54)
for any given s ∈ S , j ∈ J , and a ∈ A, where c˜(s, j, a) is a constant. Then, the transition prob-
ability p∗u,v can be given by p
∗
u,v = ∑s∈S d
π(s)p¯u,v(1/2 + [m˜(s, j, a) + c˜(s, j, a)]β + o(β)),
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based on Eqs. (SI.14) and (SI.16). According to Eq. (SI.21), it follows that there exists a set of
coefficients k˜j,a and g˜j,a such that
∑
n∈N
nx′n(0) = ∑
j∈J
∑
a∈A
[k˜j,a ∑
s∈S
dπ(s)m˜(s, j, a) + g˜j,a ∑
s∈S
dπ(s)c˜(s, j, a)]
= ∑
j∈J
∑
a∈A
k˜j,a ∑
s∈S
dπ(s)[µ˜(a)aj(s) + ν˜(a)bj(s)]
+ ∑
j∈J
∑
a∈A
g˜j,a ∑
s∈S
dπ(s)c˜(s, j, a)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
c˜
= ∑
s∈S
dπ(s) ∑
j∈J

∑a∈A k˜j,aµ˜(a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
σj
aj(s) + ∑
a∈A
k˜j,aν˜(a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
δj
bj(s)

+ c˜
= ∑
s∈S
dπ(s) ∑
j∈J
[
σjaj(s) + δjbj(s)
]
+ c˜.
(SI.55)
Then, based on Eqs. (SI.10) and (SI.11), we have 〈xC〉 > 1/2 under weak selection if and only
if
∑
s∈S
dπ(s) ∑
j∈J
[
σjaj(s) + δjbj(s)
]
+ c˜ > 0. (SI.56)
Finally, in view of the symmetric property of these two update rules and via a similar compu-
tational process as Eqs. (SI.26) – (SI.28), we can get σj = −δd−1−j and c˜ = 0. As a result,
inequality (SI.56) is changed to
∑
s∈S
dπ(s) ∑
j∈J
σj[aj(s)− bd−1−j(s)] > 0, (SI.57)
where σj, ∀j ∈ J , are some coefficients needed to be calculated for the given population struc-
ture, and independent of both aj(s) and bj(s). In particular, for finite well-mixed and structured
populations, these coefficients can be obtained by solving Eq. (SI.39) and Eq. (SI.47), respec-
tively. Substituting Eq. (SI.50), (SI.51), or (SI.53) into them, these σ-coefficients are given by
σj = (
d−1
j )/2
d+1 for the smoothed best response of the Fermi form, and σj = (
d−1
j )/2
d+2 for
the aspiration-based updating rule, in either finite well-mixed populations or structured popula-
tions.
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Complete graph
Random regular
        graph
Regular graph
Degree d-1: 3 4 6 8
Figure S1: Average abundance of C players for different population structures and different network degrees when
players update actions via the reinforcement learning. Parameter values are the same as in Fig. 3.
Figure S2: Expected payoff per round for different population structures and different network degrees when players
update actions via the reinforcement learning. Parameter values are the same as in Fig. 3.
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Figure S3: Differences in the average abundance of C players between the reinforcement learning (RL) and the
non-learning updates – the smoothed best response (BR) and the aspiration-based rule (Aspiration), for different
population structures and different network degrees. Parameter values are the same as in Fig. 3.
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Figure S4: Differences in the expected payoff per round between the reinforcement learning (RL) and the non-
learning updates – the smoothed best response (BR) and the aspiration-based rule (Aspiration), for different popu-
lation structures and different network degrees. Parameter values are the same as in Fig. 3.
36
3 4 6 8
BR AS BR AS BR AS BR ASRL RL RL RL
-0.0004
-0.0002
0.0000
0.0002
0.0004
 25%~75%
 Range within 1.5IQR
 Median Line
 Mean
 Complete graph
 Random regular graph
 Regular graph
Degree
   d-1    D
iff
er
en
ce
s b
et
w
ee
n 
an
al
yt
ic
al
 re
su
lts
 a
nd
 si
m
ul
at
io
ns
=
Figure S5: Differences between analytical results and simulations for different population structures and different
network degrees. RL, BR, and AS represent the reinforcement learning, smoothed best response, and aspiration-
based rule, respectively. Circles are the error values between analytical results and simulations obtained in the whole
simplex parameter space consisting of the distribution of the PGG, TPGG, and dSD. Parameter values are the same
as in Fig. 3.
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